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*Report of the committee on statistics and origin of fires.* (New York: National Board of Underwriters. 1920.)

*Reports of fire insurance companies for year ending December 31, 1918.* Fourteenth annual edition. (Chicago: Spectator Co. 1919. Pp. 432. \$5.)

*Requirements for admission to foreign insurance corporations (fire and marine) to the state of New York.* (New York: C. P. Stewart & Co. 1920.)

*A system of records for local farmers' mutual fire insurance companies.* Farmers bulletin no. 840. (Washington: Supt. Docs. 1920.)

*What constitutes a reasonable underwriting profit and the method of determining same.* (New York: National Board of Fire Underwriters. 1920. Pp. 29.)

*Workmen's compensation law of Porto Rico, amendments effective September 17, 1919; of Massachusetts, with amendments and supplementary acts, August, 1919.* (New York: F. R. Jones, 80 Maiden Lane. 1920. Pp. 26; 48.)

### Socialism and Co-operative Enterprises

*Socialism versus Civilization.* By BORIS BRASOL. With an introduction by T. N. CARVER. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1920. Pp. xxiv, 289. \$2.00.)

A few years ago, when socialism was, at best, a semi-scientific theory of social evolution, and, at worst, a utopian propaganda, it was usual for critics to deal with it in a spirit of good humored tolerance; but now that it seriously threatens the foundations of civilization, disinterested exposition has changed to active opposition and counter propaganda. Formerly, too, socialistic theory was regarded as a mere by-product or symptom or shadow of unsatisfactory industrial conditions; but now it is recognized as a powerful toxic product that may poison and destroy the social organism. Thus Professor Carver, in his introduction, says:

There is a close parallelism between the overthrow of an ancient civilization by invasion from without and the proposed overthrow of civilization by revolution from within. In neither case is there a conscious desire to destroy civilization. There is only a conscious determination to take possession of what is now in possession of others. . . . The only things that will save civilization are, first, to make it possible for the great majority to prosper under this system, as they do in this country, and, second, to show them that this system of liberty and voluntary agreement is the best possible system for men of intelligence, virtue and productive capacity.

Mr. Brasol shows very clearly the many weak points of socialistic theory, even as amended by revisionists, syndicalists, and guild socialists, and the more obvious weaknesses of such proposals for social reorganization as they have ventured to make; but his most formidable attack is directed against the bolshevist experiment in Russia, the ghastly failure of which has done more to discredit socialism than volumes of learned criticism or millions of popular tracts could ever do. Socialists will say, of course, that Russia was not "ripe" for the revolution, and Mr. Brasol admits a certain validity to this defense, calling attention to the fact that out of 180,000,000 of the pre-war population, approximately 120,000,000 were peasants and only 6,500,000 or 7,000,000 were proletarians in the Marxian sense. Most authorities, in fact, place the number of peasants much higher than this. In other respects, however, the experiment has been tried under favorable conditions, especially in that the agricultural character of the country and its tremendous natural resources has enabled the socialist government to prolong its existence as it could not have done in any other country. True, the blockade was injurious, but it has never been complete; it did not interrupt the trade with Germany, Scandinavia and China; and was not the cause of the breakdown of the railways, as Russia had a number of excellent rolling mills and adequate facilities for the manufacture of locomotives and other equipment. The revolution was deliberately planned and ruthlessly executed in accordance with the most approved tactics of the Marxian left wing, and the responsibility for its failure cannot be evaded or shifted. As Lenine himself said to Mr. Arthur Ransome, "Russia was indeed the only country in which the revolution could start."

The failure of this gigantic experiment is seen not only in the industrial paralysis of Russia, the introduction of compulsory labor, the collapse of the monetary system, the seizing of supplies by the government in lieu of taxes, and the payment of high salaries to "bourgeois specialists"; but more clearly in the rise of a new bourgeoisie, a social group of grafters and profiteers who are always law breakers, carrying on what little business there is in secret and at extortionate prices. One is reminded of the parable of the devil that was cast out of a man but later returned with seven other devils worse than the first.

Regardless of Russian experience, socialists of the left wing are planning similar revolutions in various parts of the world,

with thousands of agents fomenting unrest in every possible way —by propaganda in shops, schools and churches, in newspapers and magazines, by revolutionary strikes, by demanding the nationalization of railways and mines, by undermining the loyalty of the army and the police, and by unrestrained and unreasonable criticism of the existing industrial order. Doubtless Mr. Brasol is right in affirming that such a conspiracy exists and should be carefully watched, but he seems to overstate the case by giving too little weight to other causes of unrest and by too sweeping condemnation of everything that savors of socialism in the slightest degree. Then, too, the author makes careless statements here and there, as when he links together the British I. L. P. with the American I. W. W. and the German Spartacans, gives the date of the Bolshevik coup d'état as October 28, 1917, instead of November 7 (Oct. 25, O. S.), and designates as a "well known economic law" the truism that the increase in the prices of products involves a decrease in the value of money. For all that, Mr. Brasol's book gives a just though not a neutral estimate of the character and aims of modern socialism. But neutrality is a questionable virtue in time of war.

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*Coöperative and Other Organized Methods of Marketing California Horticulture Products.* By JOHN WILLIAM LLOYD. (Urbana: University of Illinois. 1919. Pp. 142. \$1.25.)

No work shows as completely as this the historical development of farmers' coöperative marketing organizations in the United States and the problems of distributing food products through them with some regard for the interests of producers and consumers. The condition of growers in California before their organization into associations for marketing their own products is shown by the author to have been unfavorable to the continuance of production. Prices paid for farm products by brokers and jobbers were below the cost of production. In 1915 the price paid the peach-grower was only two and a half cents per pound, one cent below the average cost of production. Low prices were due to the fact that the packers speculated with the crop and influenced prices to their own advantage whether buying or selling. They would tell the growers that there was not much demand for their peaches and the jobber that the crops were short. Similar